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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
In addition to Appellant Traco Steel Erectors, Inc. and Appellee Comtrol, Inc., the 
following were parties to the proceedings below: 
1. Gos's Welding, Inc. 
2. Dwamco, Inc. 
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STATEMENT REGARDING JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 
78-2-2(3)0) and UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)Q). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Issue 1: Whether Appellant's appeal of the Trial Court's findings must be denied 
because Appellant failed to marshal the evidence supporting the Trial Court's findings. 
Standard of Review: Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
requires "[a] party challenging a fact finding [to] first marshal all record evidence that 
supports the challenged finding." United Park City Mines v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain 
Fonds,etal., 2006 UT 35,124, 140 P.3d 1200 (2006); see also. State v. Clark, 2005 UT 75, 
1 17, 124 P.3d 235; Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fradan Mfg. Corp., 2002 UT 94, f 21, 54 P.3d 
1177. To pass this threshold, parties protesting findings of fact must "marshal all the 
evidence in support of the finding and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally 
insufficient to support the finding even when viewing it in a light most favorable to the court 
below." Clark, 2005 UT 75, f 17 
Issue 2: Whether the Trial Court erred in granting summary judgment to Appellee 
on the Army Reserve Project, in light of the submission of the sham Affidavit of Tracy 
Bronson, which contained statements not based on personal knowledge, and in direct 
contradiction to Mr. Branson's deposition testimony. 
Standard of Review: Correctness. See, Gary Porter Const, v. Fox Const, Inc., 101 
P.3d 371, 374 (Utah Ct. App. 2004). In reviewing summary judgment rulings, appellate 
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courts will not consider fact issues raised by affidavits which contradict the affiant's 
deposition testimony. Harnicher v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 962 P.2d 67, 71 (Utah 1998). 
Issue 3: Whether the Trial Court erred in awarding damages to Appellee. 
Standard of Review: The amount of damages awarded by a trial court may only be 
reversed on appeal if clearly erroneous. See, Mahana v. Onyx Acceptance Corp., 96 P.3d 
893 (Utah 2004); Aris Vision Inst., Inc. v. Wasatch Prop. Mgmt, Inc., 121 P.3d24(UtahCt. 
App. 2005). 
Issue 4: Whether the Trial Court erred in concluding that contractual provisions which 
barred change orders that were not submitted in writing and approved by specific employees 
of Appellee, barred Appellant's attempts to recover on the unsigned change orders for 
alleged work beyond the scope of the original agreement with Appellee. 
Standard of Review: Correctness. See, Interwest Const, v. Palmer, 923 P.2d 1350, 
1359-60 (Utah 1996). 
Issue 5: Whether the Trial Court erred in concluding that lien releases executed by 
Appellant which state that Appellant was releasing "all rights to . . . claims . . . for labor and 
materials furnished on or before [date]" were enforceable as a waiver of Appellant's claims 
for work predating those releases. 
Standard of Review: Correctness. See, Interwest Const, v. Palmer. 923 P.2d 1350, 
1359-60 (Utah 1996). 
Issue 6: Whether the Trial Court erred in awarding attorneys' fees to Appellee, after 
determining that it was the prevailing party. 
2 
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Standard of Review: Atrial court's determination of the prevailing party is reviewed 
for abuse of discretion. Lunceford v. Lunceford, 139 P.3d 1073 (Utah Ct. App. 2006); The 
amount of attorneys fees is only reversible upon a finding of patent error or clear abuse of 
discretion. Jensen v. Sawyers. 130 P.3d 325, 348 (Utah 2005). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS, STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
UTAH R. Civ. P. 56(e) 
UTAH R. APP. P. 24(a)(9) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involved claims by Appellant, a steel erector subcontractor, Traco Steel 
Erectors, Inc. ("Traco") against Appellee, a general contractor, Comtrol, Inc. ("Comtrol"), 
and counterclaims by Comtrol. The disputes related to three separate projects, a U.S. Army 
Reserve Center, the U.V.S.C. Student Center Expansion, and the Ethel Wattis Kimball Arts 
Center at Weber State University. 
Traco's claims against Comtrol were based primarily on change orders. Comtrol 
defended against the claims by asserting that Traco had not followed the change order 
procedures set forth in the subcontracts between Comtrol and Traco, and that Traco had 
waived the right to collect on many of the change orders by signing lien releases. 
Comtrol's claims against Traco related to damages incurred when Comtrol had to 
finish Traco's work after Traco abandoned the projects. Traco asserted that it was justified 
in leaving the jobs because of Comtrol's failure to pay the disputed change orders. Comtrol 
received summary judgment on the U.S. Army Reserve Project on the basis that the final 
/13Q<;77 1 
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Change Order that Traco had signed set forth the contract balance, and showed that Traco 
had been overpaid by more than $9,000. 
At trial, Comtrol prevailed against Traco's change order claims, with the Trial Court 
ruling that the provisions of the contract, as well as Traco's lien releases, barred recovery. 
After a careful and complete review of the evidence, the Trial Court found that Traco had not 
been justified in abandoning the jobs, and awarded Comtrol most of its requested damages 
for completing Traco's work, reducing certain of the costs that the Trial Court found 
excessive. 
FACTS RELEVANT TO ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Comtrol is a General Contractor and Traco is a steel erector subcontractor. (R-
7, Complaint at f 24). Traco and Comtrol entered into similar Subcontractor Agreements for 
the construction of three separate projects: (1) the U.S. Army Reserve Contract, (R-190-94); 
(2) the UVSC Student Center Expansion (D. Ex. 51); and (3) the Weber State Visual Art 
Center (D. Ex. 1). 
2. Each of the Subcontractor Agreements had the following five provisions: 
11. Scheduling: Subcontractor has examined, and approved of, the 
preliminary project schedule. During the progress of the work Subcontractor 
will promptly supply to Contractor all scheduling information required by 
Contractor. Subcontractor will promptly review and comply with all revised 
schedules issued by Contractor. Subcontractor will employ an increased work 
force and overtime, if necessary, to comply with the Contractor's scheduling 
requirements. No extra compensation will be paid to Subcontractor for the 
additional work force or overtime in the absence of written agreement by 
Contractor to reimburse such costs. 
13. Commencement and Progress: Subcontractor will commence work 
within three days after telephone or written notice from Contractor to do so, 
4 
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and shall prosecute the work diligently and in accordance with Contractor's 
project schedule. 
16. No Damages for Delay to Subcontractor: Subcontractor will complete 
all work required under this Subcontract pursuant to Contractor's project 
schedule. In the event that Subcontractor is obstructed or delayed in its 
performance of its work by Contractor or Owner, Subcontractor will be 
entitled to a reasonable extension of time. It is agreed that the extension of 
time will be subcontractor's sole and exclusive remedy for such obstruction or 
delay, and that in no event will the Subcontractor be entitled to recover 
damages from Contractor or Owner for such obstruction or delay. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, if the delay is caused by the Owner, Contractor 
shall not be obligated to extend Subcontractor's time for any greater length of 
time that the Contractor's time is extended by the Owner for the delay. 
18. Mutual Responsibility of Subcontractors: Subcontractor accepts mutual 
responsibility, along with Contractor and all other subcontractors on the 
project, for the prompt, efficient, and coordinated progress for the work. 
Subcontractor will keep itself informed as to the progress of Contractor and 
other subcontractors, and will coordinate its operations with Contractor and 
other subcontractors so as to facilitate the progress of the work. In the event 
of conflict between subcontractors as to access to work areas, coordination, or 
scheduling, the orders of the Contractor shall be followed. 
26. Changes: Contractor may add to or subtract from the scope of 
Subcontractor's work by written change order, and the Subcontractor will 
promptly perform the work as modified. If the Subcontractor contends that a 
change order results in a net increase in the Subcontractor' s cost of performing 
the work, Subcontractor will promptly, within ten days after the issuance of the 
change order provide Contractor with a detailed estimate of the additional cost. 
The parties will then negotiate an equitable adjustment to the subcontract 
price. If agreement is not reached as to the amount by which the subcontract 
price should be adjusted, Subcontractor will continue performance of the 
change order, and the amount of the adjustment will be determined later. 
Change orders must be issued only in writing. The only person with authority 
to issue change orders on behalf of the Contractor is Brian Burk or Ralph 
Burk. The authorized person may be changed by written notice. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Contractor shall not be obligated to 
5 
Subcontractor for any amount greater than Contractor receives from the Owner 
for the change.1 
31. Contractor's Right to do Subcontractor's Work: If Subcontractor fails 
to supply sufficient forces, equipment or materials to advance the work 
according to Contractor's schedule, then Contractor may use its own forces, 
equipment, or materials to supply such portions of the work as are necessary 
to increase the rate of progress, and Contractor shall deduct the expense, with 
reasonable overhead and profit, from the subcontract price. 
34. Default. In the event that Subcontractor appears likely to be unable to 
complete its work according to Contractor's project schedule, or if 
Subcontractor fails to fully perform its duties under this Subcontract, or if 
Subcontractor becomes insolvent, or fails to supply sufficient forces to 
maintain this schedule, or is guilty of any other default under this Subcontract, 
then Contractor may (a) withhold payment for work performed under this 
Subcontract and withhold payment of any other obligation of Contractor to 
Subcontractor; (b) after giving 48 hours written notice to Subcontractor, eject 
Subcontractor and take over Subcontractor's work and terminate 
Subcontractor's right to perform under the Subcontract. If Contractor takes 
over Subcontractor's work, then Contractor will charge Subcontractor for all 
costs incurred as a result, including reasonable overhead and profit and 
including attorney's fees and other expenses. If the total amount exceeds the 
unpaid balance of the Subcontract, then Subcontractor shall pay the difference 
to Contractor. If the amount is less than the unpaid balance of the Subcontract, 
the excess shall be paid by Contractor to Subcontractor. 
If Contractor takes over Subcontractor's work, Subcontractor shall permit 
Contractor to take possession of all of Subcontractor's materials, equipment, 
tools, and appliances at the jobsite for the purposes of completing 
Subcontractor's work. Subcontractor will cooperate with Contractor to 
facilitate an orderly take-over. 
*For the U.S. Army Reserve subcontract, this paragraph had one difference, in that the 
names of the persons authorized to approve Change Orders on behalf of Comtrol were 
omitted, with only a blank, such that the sentence read "The only person with authority to 
issue change orders on behalf of the Contractor is ." [Left blank in original] 
(R-192). 
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3. In addition the UVSC and Weber State Subcontracts contained the following 
language: 
Any additional work performed, under which you may issue a claim against 
your contract on this project, must be submitted in writing within (10) days of 
discovery of the change. If you proceed on verbal instructions, you proceed 
at your own risk.2 
4. In addition to the projects at issue in this case, Traco had previously served as 
a subcontractor on several projects for Comtrol. (R-900). 
5. Comtrol's standard change order form contains accord and satisfaction 
language and an entry that sets forth the revised contract amount created by that change 
order. (R-900; see, e.g., R-240). 
6. This change order form was used on each project at issue in this case, and in 
each of the other jobs Traco had worked for Comtrol. All change orders signed by Traco 
representatives and the authorized Comtrol representative (Brian Burk), in this case were on 
this form, and in each case, the change order set forth the revised contract amount created by 
that change order. (R-900-901). 
7. On all projects, and with respect to all subcontractors, Comtrol consistently 
enforces the requirements: (1) that requests for change orders be submitted in writing, (2) 
that change orders be submitted within ten days of the discovery of the change, and (3) that 
2
 In the UVSC Contract (D. Ex. 51), this language appears in Attachment A-l at 
Paragraph 11, and in the Weber State Contract (D. Ex. 1), it appears in Attachment A-l at 
Paragraph 12. 
7 
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change orders are only effective if signed by Brian Burk or Ralph Burk. (R-901; R-1050 at 
1062,11. 1-19). 
8. Traco's own proposed change order forms bear the language, "This change 
order must be signed and returned immediately to Traco thus verifying that we have 
authorization to proceed." (R-901). See, e.g., P. Ex. 28. 
U.S. Army Reserve Project 
9. On October 28,1998, Comtrol and Traco entered into a Subcontract Agreement 
for steel erection at the U.S. Army Reserve Center located at 5500 West 700 South, Salt 
Lake City. (R-190-94). The contract amount was initially $42,100. (R-190 at]f 8). 
10. The Subcontract Agreement was subsequently revised by the following 
approved change orders to $64,218.90: 
3605 Beams & Columns $2,070.00 
3626 Furnish Crane $3,900.00 
3816 Back charges McQueen -$ 255.18 
damage 
3908 
4036 
4037 
4061 
4251 
Weld & install brick lintel 
Revise TC 
Increase in wage rate 
Steel framing duct work 
T&M Backcharge 
$350.00 
$850.00 
$12,994.08 
$2,000.00 
$210.00 
(R-196-203). 
11. The Subcontract Agreement provided that Traco was to supply a crane for the 
entire job. However, due to delays in portions of the job being ready, Traco only rented a 
crane from a rental agency for 1-3 days and then returned the rented crane. Deposition of 
488537 1 
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Tracy Bronson, R-206, at 22,11. 17-23. For the remainder of the job, Traco used ComtroPs 
crane and ComtroPs operator. Id (R-206 at 24,11. 17 - 29). 
12. While Traco believed that it should have been paid more for having to wait for 
different parts of the job to become ready, it did not submit any such requests for payment 
to Comtrol. (R-207 at 36,1. 18 - 37,1. 4). Nor did Traco make any request for additional 
time. Id at 37,11. 16-21. Instead, Traco failed to return to the job to finish the work for 
which it had contracted. (R-208 at 41,1. 14 - 42,1. 16). 
13. On November 7, 2000, Comtrol issued Change Order 4258 (R-212), back 
charging Traco for $13,345.00 for crane usage and additional work Comtrol had to perform 
to complete Traco's obligations under the Subcontract Agreement. Change Order 4258 was 
mailed to Traco on November 9, 2000. (R-213, R-252; Affidavit of Sharon Zobell at f 6). 
14. In response to Change Order 4258, Traco admitted that some of its work had 
been performed by Comtrol, but disputed the back charge amounts in Change Order 4258 
and never signed it. (R-209 at 49-50). 
15. However, on November 28, 2000, Tracy Bronson of Trjaco signed Change 
Order 4263, which revised the Contract total to $50,023.90. (R-240). That Change Order 
further stated, 
It is understood and agreed that the acceptance of this contract modification 
by the subcontractor constitutes an accord and satisfaction, and represents the 
final adjustment of any and all costs, delays, time extensions or other equitable 
adjustment, if any, arising out of, or incidental to, the work herein revised. 
NOTE: This Change Order becomes part of and in conformance with the 
existing contract. 
14 
9 
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16. At his deposition on February 10, 2005, Tracy Bronson testified that he 
understood that Change Order 4263 revised the contract amount to $50,023.90. (R-210 at 
57,11, 1 - 6). 
17. For Traco's work on the U.S. Army Reserve Project, Comtrol paid Traco 
$59,201.95 in seven payments, as follows: 
Payments 
Chk 36782 7/2/99 
Chk 37056 8/20/99 
Chk 37457 10/27/99 
Chk 37768 12/17/99 
Chk 38055 2/1/00 
Chk 38229 2/28/00 
Chk 38379 3/24/00 
TOTAL 
10,111-50 
13,500.00 
9,000.00 
9,000.00 
12,994.08 
3,495.37 
1.101.00 
$59,201.95 
(R-242-255, copies of checks; R-262, Affidavit of Sharon Zobell at f 8). 
18. Comtrol sought summary judgment with respect to the U.S. Army Reserve 
Project contending, inter alia, that Change Order 4263 was a valid accord and satisfaction. 
(R-183). 
19. In opposing Comtrol's Motion for Summary Judgment, Traco submitted an 
affidavit from Tracy Bronson (R-282-89) stating that he had made a mistake in signing 
Change Order 4263, in that he had not noticed the revised contract amount set forth on the 
face of the document. (R-287 at f 14). 
20. Comtrol moved to strike the affidavit, pointing out that it contradicted Mr. 
Bronson's deposition testimony on February 10, 2005, as to his understanding of the effect 
of the Change Order without explaining the discrepancy. (R-539; R-473-74). 
488537 1 
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21. Comtrol also argued, in submitting a Reply Memorandum in support of its 
Motion for Summary Judgment, that even if Mr. Branson's Affidavit were considered by the 
Court, it did not meet the legal standard for unilateral mistake, and was not therefore 
sufficient to defeat the Motion for Summary Judgment. (R-476-78). 
22. Traco responded to Comtrol's Motion to Strike by stating that not only had Mr. 
Bronson been mistaken in signing the Change Order, he had also made a mistake in testifying 
at his deposition. (R-604). To correct the second "mistake," Traco submitted an untimely 
deposition correction. (R-606). 
23. In granting Comtrol's Motion for Summary Judgment, the Trial Court ruled 
that Change Order 4263 was a valid accord and satisfaction, entitling Comtrol to summary 
judgment for the $9,178.05 amount it had overpaid Traco on the U.S. Army Reserve project. 
(R-1056 at 2). While it did not rule on the Motion to Strike, the Trial Court found that Traco 
had not created an issue of fact on the issue of unilateral mistake. (R-1056 at 2). 
UVSC Project 
24. On May 24, 2000, Comtrol and Traco entered into a Subcontract Agreement 
for the steel erection on the UVSC Student Center Expansion located in Orem for the price 
of $111,000.00. (D.Ex. 51). 
25. The Contract amount was reduced to $ 108,406.22 by approved change orders 
and Owner Controlled Insurance Program ("OOP") adjustments in the following amounts: 
CO 4175 Install beam $1,500 (P. Ex. 85) 
CO 4343 Add guard rail $300 (D. Ex. 55) 
CO 4514 Weld angle joint $175 (P. Ex. 91) 
CO 4481 Initial OCIP deduct $-5,407.00 (D. Ex. 58) 
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CO 5465 Final OCIP adjust $838.22 (D. Ex. 52) 
Total -$2,593.78 
R-901 at^j 10; D. Ex. 78 at COM 0213. 
26. Over the course of this project, Comtrol made the following payments to Traco: 
8/16/2000 Check 39397 $5,700.00 
11/9/2000 Check 40044 $1,425.00 
5/9/2001 Check 41255 $27,265.00 
6/4/2001 Check 41375 $56,923.05 
8/6/2001 Check 41803 $6.175.00 
Total $97,488.05 
(R-901 atf 11; D. Ex. 78 at COM 0212). 
27. The Trial Court considered the amounts that had been contractually agreed to 
by the parties for the UVSC project, and the amounts paid to Traco by Comtrol for that 
project, finding a balance on the contract of $10,918.17. (R-902 at 112). 
28. In addition to the approved Change Orders, which revised and reduced the 
Subcontractor Agreement amount to $108,406.22, Comtrol issued additional back charges 
against Traco, relating to work within Traco's scope of work that Comtrol had to perform 
because Traco either did not provide an adequate work force, or asked to use Comtrol' s crane 
or forklift to unload steel that had arrived at the job site, or refused to perform the work. 
These back charges totalled $20,748.17 and were calculated as follows: 
No. 4268 Deduct to Unload Steel -$415.00 (P. Ex. 55) 
No. 4569 Deduct for hoisting -$1,957.50 (P. Ex. 65) 
No. 4700 Deduct for hoisting/materials -$1,095.94 (P. Ex. 67) 
Back charges to Complete 
Traco's Work -$17.279.73 (P. Ex. 74) 
Total -$20,748.17 
(R-902 at 1 902;P. Ex. 78 at COM 0213). 
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29. The work on this Project required tight coordination with the other 
subcontractors inasmuch as there was a very limited staging area and the work was to be 
performed in four discrete stages, requiring Traco to break up the timing of its work. See, 
Attachment A to D. Ex. 51. 
30. During the course of the Project, Traco personnel did not attend weekly 
meetings held to coordinate the timing of the work among subcontractors. See, D. Ex. 76. 
Traco's absence from these meeting seriously impacted coordination among the 
subcontractors (and in particular with respect to the coordination of steel deliveries by 
Dwamco). (R-1050 at 1074,1. 13 - 1076,1. 20; R-903). 
31. Traco performed its first portion of the work, Phase I, in June and July of 2000. 
During this period, on two occasions, July 18 and July 28,2000, Traco asked for permission 
to use Comtrol's crane and forklift to unload steel. Mr. Eugene Cook, Comtrol's 
superintendent, noted potential backcharges on the timecards of employees who helped in 
unloading the steel, or on the daily reports, and change order 4268 was prepared and issued 
using those notations. (R-1050 at 1082-83; D. Ex. 54). 
32. By January of 2001, Traco began its work on the other phases of the Project. 
On April 4, 2001, Comtrol advised Traco that it was behind schedule and was impacting 
other trades. (P. Ex. 57). Traco had been using a two-to-four-man crew over the prior three 
weeks which was insufficient to maintain adequate progress. Id. The Comtrol letter 
reminded Traco of the Liquidated Damages the Owner would impose on Comtrol if the 
project was not completed timely. Comtrol directed Traco to return to work immediately and 
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regain the lost time. Id. Traco was directed in writing to explain by April 5, 2001, the 
actions Traco would take to regain the lost time. Id Traco failed to provide this information 
to Comtrol. (R-1049 at 878). 
33. On April 24, 2001, Comtrol's Superintendent Eugene Cook called Traco to 
complain that Traco had only one person on site. The other subcontractors on the Project had 
complained that Traco was holding them up. Mr. Cook was told by Traco's foreman that 
Tracy Bronson was having a personal problem but would be at the job site later that day. Mr. 
Bronson never arrived. Mr. Cook was not successful in speaking with Mr. Bronson, but left 
a telephone message. (D. Ex. 77). 
34. On May 30, 2001, Traco executed a Subcontractor Lien Waiver that waived 
and released Traco's right to any claims for labor and materials provided to the UVSC 
project on or before April 30,2001. (P. Ex. 63). This release was in exchange for Comtrol's 
payment of $56,923.05 to Traco, which payment was made by Comtrol via Check No. 41375, 
thus rendering the release fully effective. (D. Ex. 78). 
35. Throughout 2001, Traco continued to use Comtrol's crane and forklift to 
unload steel. In one case, this was done without Comtrol's permission, as Traco came to the 
job site on a Sunday, May 6, 2001, when Comtrol was not on the job. Mr. Cook continued 
to note Traco's use of Comtrol's forklift and crane on time cards/and or daily reports, and 
Change Orders 4569 (P. Ex. 65) and 4700 (P. Ex. 67) resulted. 
36. With the exception of railings and punch list items, which was part of Traco's 
subcontract, Traco's work had been completed by the end of September, 2001. In early 
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January of 2002, Comtrol advised Traco orally that the hand railing materials had been 
delivered to the job site and that Traco should return to install the railing per Traco's 
Subcontractor Agreement (D. Ex. 69). Traco refused to do so. (D. Ex. 69, R-1049 at 900, 
1. 20 - 902,1. 7). 
37. On January 3, 2002, Comtrol gave Traco a written 48-hour notice to report to 
the Project, initiate work and perform diligently. Comtrol advised Traco that if it did not 
return, Comtrol would have the work performed by others and back charge Traco. (D. Ex. 
69). Traco responded that it would not return until it was paid "all outstanding Contract 
Draws and Change Orders." Traco further demanded that the railing work be made a change 
order. (D. Ex. 70). Traco did not make a request for additional time. However, the 
Subcontractor Agreement between Traco and Comtrol provided that in the event of a dispute 
as to the scope of work, Traco was to still "promptly follow the written orders" of Comtrol 
and the "dispute will be settled later." (P. Ex. 51 at Paragraph 28). 
3 8. The Subcontractor Agreement also provided, "Subcontractor will not interrupt 
or delay its work because of any dispute with Contractor, but will continue to perform its 
subcontract work diligently to completion, and will later negotiate in good faith for 
settlement of the dispute. (D. Ex. 51 at Paragraph 29). Traco refused to return and 
abandoned the job. (R-1049 at 900,1. 20 - 902,1. 7). 
39. Thereafter Comtrol and a subcontractor, Gorden Johansen, performed the hand 
railing work, as well as the other uncompleted Traco work. Comtrol attempted to mitigate 
its damages by hiring Mr. Johansen, a skilled welder, instead of hiring another steel erection 
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company. (R-1049 at 957,11. 19-25). To complete the work, Comtrol backcharged Traco 
$17,279.73. (D.Ex. 74). 
40. The hourly rate of $50.68 charged by Comtrol in calculating its backcharge was 
based, in part, on a publication entitled "R.S. Means Building Construction Cost Data, 2001, 
Western Edition." (D. Ex. 79; R-1049 at 959,11. 15-21). Comtrol uses this publication for 
estimating purposes in bidding jobs, and has used it for this purpose on several hundred 
projects. (R-1049 at 959,11. 22-25; R-1049 at 960, 11. 17-20). The rates set forth in R.S. 
Means are consistent with Utah market rates for steel workers. (R-1049 at 960,1. 21 - 961, 
1.4). 
41. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Trial Court concluded that Comtrol's 
backcharges were excessive, and reduced the completion backcharge to $8,900.00, finding 
that to be the reasonable market value of the work performed by Comtrol to complete the 
project. (R-905-06). Weighing all backcharges against the outstanding contract balance due 
to Traco, the Trial Court found that Traco owed Comtrol $1,450.27. (R-906 at 125). 
42. However, Traco asserted a number of back charges and/or change orders 
against Comtrol which Traco claimed should be factored into the final contract analysis for 
this Project, totaling $19,753.25, maintaining that its claims arose from fabrication errors 
made by Dwamco, the fabricator, which Traco allegedly repaired. (P. Ex. 2). 
43. Traco brought these errors to the attention of Comtrol and Dwamco, and then 
made arrangements with Dwamco to correct the errors. Thereafter, Traco and Dwamco 
reached agreements on the issues of whether Traco or Dwamco would be making the repairs, 
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and the price that Dwamco would pay to Traco when Traco did make the repairs. (R-1050 
at 1063,1. 18 - 1064,1. 5). Comtrol was not a party to these agreements, or involved in the 
negotiations that gave rise to them. Indeed, Comtrol's superintendent on the project, Eugene 
Cook, testified that he had not been involved at all in the negotiations between Traco and the 
other subcontractors with respect to the price of Traco's repairs. (R-1050 at 1063,1.18-
1064,1. 13). 
44. When Traco sought to invoice Comtrol for this work, Comtrol consistently 
advised Traco that it should look to Dwamco for recovery. (P. Ex. 114). In fact, Traco 
invoiced Dwamco for much of this work, (P. Ex. 108), and sued Dwamco, seeking recovery 
for that work in the proceedings below. (R-5, Traco's Fourth Cause of Action; P. Ex. 2 
(captioned 'Traco Steel Claim for Damages Against Comtrol, Inc. and/or Dwamco, Inc.")). 
45. The Trial Court held that Traco's proposed change orders were deeply flawed. 
None of them were approved by Comtrol before Traco abandoned the job. The change 
orders did not bear the signature of either Ralph Burk or Brian Burk, as was required by the 
Subcontractor Agreement at paragraph 26. One of Traco's proposed Change Orders, No. 5 
(P. Ex. 78), bears the signature of Eugene Cook, who testified that when he signed, he was 
only verifying the hours worked, and not approving any change in the contract price. (R-906 
at f 27; R-1050 at 1067,1. 19 - 1068,1. 3). 
46. The Trial Court found that these Dwamco-related change orders failed to 
demonstrate any meeting of the minds between Comtrol and Traco on the integral elements 
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of an agreement, including price or a method for determining price, rendering the proposed 
change orders too indefinite and uncertain for enforcement. (R-907 at ^  29). 
47. The Trial Court also found that seven of the UVSC change orders submitted 
by Traco, totaling $ 10,3 55.25, sought recovery for work that was waived by Traco in its May 
30, 2001 Lien Release, in that the work was performed prior to April 30,2001, the effective 
day of the Release. (See, D. Ex. 63). These include: 
Proposed Change Order Date of Work Amount Sought 
DWAMCO CO 1 April 22, 2001 $ 3,592.00 
DWAMCOC0 2 April 2-5,2001 $ 672.00 
DWAMCO CO 3 April 10, 2001 $ 3,582.16 
DWAMCO CO 4 Before April 25,2001 $ 1,008.00 
DWAMCO CO 5 March 30, 2001 $ 476.09 
Second CO 1 - Beam D-13 March 6,2001 $ 225.00 
Job Instruction Re Mechanical 
Opening April 24, 2001 $ 800.00 
TOTAL $10,355.25 
(R-907-08 at | 30, P. Ex. 2). 
48. Paragraph 26 of the Subcontractor Agreement provides that "Contractor shall 
not be obligated to Subcontractor for any amount greater than Contractor receives from the 
Owner for the change. The Trial Court found that Traco's failure to submit its proposed 
change orders timely prevented Comtrol from seeking approval from the Owner. Comtrol 
did not receive any increased change order amount from the Owner of the UVSC which 
Comtrol has not paid to Traco. (R-909 at ^ 34). 
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Weber State Visual Art Center 
49. On July 14, 2000, Comtrol and Traco entered into a third Subcontractor 
Agreement for the steel erection on the Weber State Visual Art Center for $270,000.00. (D. 
Ex. 51). The Contract amount was reduced by change orders and OCIP deductions to 
$254,658.24 as follows: 
Original Contract $270,000 
4424 Initial OCIP deduct 
4456 Vi Cost of Wagstaff crane 
-$13,521.00 
-$442.50 
4545 Additional welding & erection $795.00 
4548 Additional erection 
4666 Additional roof frame 
4673 Fix grids E & 4 
4714 Additional costs for ASI #23 
5513 Final OCIP deduct 
TOTAL Change Orders 
Revised Contract Amount 
$875.00 
$100.00 
$0.00 
$500.00 
-$3,648.26 
-$15,341.76 
(P. Ex. 7) 
(P. Ex. 9 ) 
(P. Ex. 5 ) 
(P. Ex. 6) 
(P. Ex. 8 ) 
(P. Ex. 10) 
(P. Ex. 35) 
$254,658.24 
(R-909at1|35). 
50. Over the course of the project, Comtrol paid Traco $252,977.85, broken down 
by individual check number as follows: 
Chk 41058 4/10/01 $35,972.00 
Chk 41339 5/30/01 $45,066.00 
Chk 41533 6/25/01 $44,931.00 
Chk 41739 7/26/01 $45,066.00 
Chk 42111 9/20/01 $23,888.85 
Chk 42279 10/12/01 $18,054.00 
Chk 42432 11/2/01 $30,000.00 
Chk 42899 12/28/01 $10,000.00 
TOTAL $252,977.85 
(P. Ex. 21). 
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51. Thus, considering only the amounts that had been contractually agreed to by 
the parties for the Art Center Project, and the amounts paid to Traco by Comtrol, the balance 
on the contract was $1,680.39. (R-910 at f 36). 
52. As was the case with the UVSC project, the Art Center also had a small staging 
area and required coordination among the subcontractors. (R-910; R-1048 at 637,1.22 - 638, 
1.8). 
53. Traco failed to inventory the steel components delivered to the job site by the 
fabricator Gos. (R-1048 at 666,1. 10 - 667,1. 15). 
54. Early in the course of the Contract, Traco again fell behind in performing its 
work. (D. Ex. 2). Traco blamed Comtrol for steel components which it believed had not 
been delivered to the job site. (P. Ex. 11). 
55. Without Comtrol's permission, Traco removed steel from the job to use on an 
unrelated project Traco was performing for another General Contractor involving the skybox 
at the Weber State football field. (R-1048 at 674-79). On one occasion, Burt Merrill 
discovered Traco loading a trailer full of steel that was already on site and preparing to hook 
it up to a truck. (R-1048 at 678,11. 10-25). Mr. Merrill told Traco he would call the police 
if they drove the trailer off the job sight, whereupon Traco unhooked the trailer. (R-679,11. 
3-7). 
56. Traco also failed to attend weekly job site meetings on the Weber State Project 
where Comtrol coordinated the work of all of the subcontractors. While Comtrol's Project 
Manager faxed the minutes of the weekly meetings and punch lists to Traco (R-1047,11 3 -
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8), Traco's absence from these meeting seriously impacted coordination among the 
subcontractors. (D. Ex. 26; R-1047 at 329,1. 14 - 330,1. 330). 
57. Traco continued to blame Gos' and informed Comtrol by letter, dated January 
4, 2002, that if all steel for the project was not on site by 4:00 p.m that day, it would become 
Gos5 responsibility to install that steel. (P. Ex. 14). Comtrol responded that there were other 
steel components which were on the job site which Traco could erect while waiting for the 
missing parts to arrive. (R-1048at681,ll. 6-14; D. Ex. 21). Moreover, some of the missing 
parts could not be fabricated until later inasmuch as such parts were dependant upon field 
measurements which could not be taken until other portions of the Project were first 
completed. (R-1048 at 682,1. 15 - 683,1. 5). 
58. Starting in January 2002, Comtrol was forced to take over the performance of 
Traco's work. On January 4, 2002, Comtrol received written notice from Traco that it was 
abandoning the job. (P. Ex. 14). Whereupon, Comtrol notified Traco in writing that under 
Section 31 of the Subcontract Agreement, Comtrol would perform the Traco work and would 
look to Traco for the costs in completing Traco's contract (D. Ex. 21).. 
59. Comtrol's Project Manager and Superintendent both made numerous calls to 
Traco, directing Traco to return to the job site to perform its obligations and mitigate its 
damages. Traco refused to do so. (R-1048 at 680,11. 2-16; R-1048 at 688,11. 2-27). Traco 
did, however, return to the job site on occasion to take pictures. (P. Exs. 183, 184, 186 and 
187; R-1050 at 1146 , 11. 4 - 8). On one such occasion Traco was invited to attend a 
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subcontractor's meeting, but did not do so. (R-1047 at 501, 11. 4 -6). In the course of 
completing Traco's work, Comtrol incurred $58,212.50 in expenses. (D. Ex. 38). 
60. On October 17,2001, Traco executed a Subcontractor Lien Waiver that waived 
and released Traco's rights to any claims for labor and materials provided to the Weber State 
Project on or before August 31, 2001. (D. Ex. 12). This Lien Release was in exchange for 
Comtrol's payment of $18,054.00, which payment was made by Comtrol via Check No. 
42279, rendering the Release effective. (P. Ex. 21). 
6L Ten of Traco's proposed Weber State change orders, totaling $17,780.00, 
sought recovery for work that was waived by Traco's October 17,2001 Release (D. Ex. 12), 
in that the work was performed on or before August 31, 2001, the effective date of the 
Release. These included: 
Description 
BeamB-51 
Beam C-22 
Beam A-22 
Beam B-8 
Lower Beams for Recess at 
E-lOandat A-51 
Columns K-39 and M-39 
BeamB-51 
Arch Tube A70 
con 
CO 8 
Date of Work 
Before 7/29/01 
Before 7/29/01 
Before 7/29/01 
Before 7/29/01 
Before 7/29/01 
Before 7/29/01 
Before 7/29/01 
Before 7/29/01 
8/25 to 8/31/01 
6/27 to 7/2/01 
Amount Sought 
$ 112.00 
$ 280.00 
$ 280.00 
$ 112.00 
$ 1,052.00 
$ 2,206.00 
$ 1,792.00 
$ 1,120.00 
$ 8,740.00 
$ 2.086.00 
TOTAL $17,780.00 
(P. Ex. l;R-916at1J63). 
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62. Burt Merrill testified that many of the Weber State Change Orders which 
purported to bear his signature were, in fact, forgeries. (R-1048 at 643,11. 13 - 24). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Traco's appeal of the Trial Court's findings required that Traco marshal the evidence 
supporting the Trial Court's findings pursuant to Rule 24(a)(9). Traco has challenged a 
number of the Trial Court's factual findings, including (a) damages awarded to Comtrol 
arising out of Traco's failure to complete its contractual obligations; (b) the Trial Court's 
determination that Traco should not be allowed to was not entitled to recovery of additional 
monies for unsigned change orders; © the Trial Court's determination that certain lien 
releases executed by Traco waived claims for all work performed before the effective dates 
of the releases;(d) the Trial Court's determination that the facts did not support a finding that 
Comtrol agreed to pay Traco for correcting alleged errors by a steel fabricator, Dwamco; and 
(e) the Trial Court's determination that the facts did not support the application of the 
doctrine of anticipatory breach to reduce the damages awarded to Comtrol. On appeal, Traco 
has completely failed to make any effort to marshal the evidence supporting these 
determinations, as is required by UTAH R. APP. P. 24(a)(9). 
The Trial Court correctly granted Comtrol summary judgment on the U.S. Army 
project. In exchange for Comtrol performing a portion of Traco's work, Traco's president, 
Tracy Bronson, signed an unambiguous change order which was an accord and satisfaction, 
setting forth a revised contract amount. Traco attempted to defeat summary judgment by 
claiming that Mr. Bronson had mistakenly overlooked the revised contract amount. The Trial 
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Court correctly held that this assertion was not sufficient to show unilateral mistake and 
create an issue of fact. 
The Trial Court correctly assessed Comtrol's damages incurred in completing Traco's 
work. Comtrol based its damages evidence, in part, on a well-known construction industry 
estimating guide, R.S. Means, and supported its claims with time cards and daily reports 
showing the work performed. Traco had the opportunity to critique Comtrol's damages, 
claiming that certain charges were excessive. The Trial Court weighed the evidence, and 
made significant reductions to Comtrol's damages. Because the Trial Court was in the best 
position to weight the evidence, and because there was no dispute that Comtrol completed 
Traco's work, the damage award should not be overturned. 
Traco seeks to reverse the Trial Court's ruling that it could not collect for certain 
change orders involving work performed by Traco to correct alleged fabrication errors by the 
UVSC steel fabricator, Dwamco. The Trial Court correctly ruled that the subcontract, which 
warns subcontractors against proceeding to do change order work without written approval 
by Comtrol, barred those claims. Comtrol never agreed to pay Traco for this work, either 
verbally, or in writing. 
The Trial Court was also correct in enforcing unambiguous lien releases, which 
purported to release any claims for labor or materials provided before a date certain. Traco 
claimed that these releases did not bar claims for change order work performed before the 
release date. Because the releases were unambiguous, the Trial Court correctly rejected 
Traco's interpretation. 
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Finally, because the Trial Court's rulings were correct, there is no need to overturn 
the attorneys' fees award to Comtrol. 
ARGUMENT 
I. TRACO'S APPEAL SHOULD BE DENIED FOR FAILURE TO MARSHALL. 
Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires "[a] party challenging 
a fact finding [to] first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding." To 
fulfill its duty to marshall, Traco was required to, 
"temporarily remove [their] own prejudices and fully embrace the adversary's 
position"; [they] mustplay the "devil's advocate." In so doing, appellants must 
present the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court and not attempt 
to construe the evidence in a light favorable to their case . . . . In sum, to 
properly marshal the evidence the challenging party must demonstrate how the 
court found the facts from the evidence and then explain why those findings 
contradict the clear weight of the evidence. 
United Park City Mines v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds. et aL 2006 UT 35, 140 
P.3d 1200 (2006). Instead of marshalling, Traco has merely re-argued on appeal the factual 
case, leaving Corntrol and this Court "to bear the expense and time of performing the critical 
task of marshalling the evidence. This is unfair, inefficient, and unacceptable." Id. at 1207, 
f26. The Utah Supreme Court has consistently warned of the "grim consequences parties 
face when they fail to fulfill the marshalling requirement," and that the appellate court "can 
rely on that failure to affirm the lower court's findings of fact." kL at 1207,127. As such, 
"[a]n appellant may not simply cite to the evidence which supports his or her position and 
hope to prevail." Wavment v. Howard. 144 P.3d 1147, 1150 (Utah 2006) 
Put differently, 
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In order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence, the 
challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap 
of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the 
appellant resists. After constructing this magnificent array of supporting 
evidence, the challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence. The 
gravity of this flaw must be sufficient to convince the appellate court that the 
court's finding resting upon the evidence is clearly erroneous. 
West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct App. 1991). 
Because Traco's brief is bereft of even the slightest attempt at marshalling, this Court 
should affirm all of the Trial Court's findings of fact.3 
II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO 
COMTROL ON THE ARMY RESERVE CONTRACT. 
A. The Trial Court Correctly Ruled that Change Order 4263 was a Valid 
Accord and Satisfaction. 
The contractual amount due Traco for its work on the U.S. Army project was clearly 
established by contract documents agreed to by Traco. The initial contract amount was 
$42,100. Via change orders and back charges, the contract amount was subsequently revised 
to $50,023.90. That final amount was contractually agreed to by Traco when it signed 
Change Order 4263. Change Order 4263 clearly set forth a revised contract total of 
$50,023.90. It also contained language expressly informing Traco that "acceptance of this 
contract modification by the subcontractor constitutes an accord and satisfaction, and 
represents the final adjustment of any and all costs, delays, time extensions or other 
3Comtrol will set forth the facts supporting the Trial Court's various findings in the 
relevant subsections of this brief. 
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equitable adjustment, if any, arising out of, or incident to, the work herein revised." R-
240. (Emphasis added). 
Change Order 4263, signed by Traco on November 28, 2000, was the final contract 
document. It was signed by Traco after Comtrol's November 7, 2000 issuance of Change 
Order 4258, a $13,345.00 back charge. At his deposition, Tracy Bronson testified with 
unmistakable clarity that he understood that Change Order 4263 revised the contract amount 
to $50,023.90. (R-210, Bronson Depo., at 57,11.1-6). Consequently, Comtrol was entitled 
to summary judgment on the U.S. Army Reserve Center Contract on the theory that Change 
Order 4263 was a valid accord & satisfaction. 
It is a well accepted principal of construction contract law that a change order 
containing accord and satisfaction language as strong as the language at issue here constitutes 
a valid accord and satisfaction. See, e ^ , Safeco Credit v. U.S., 44 Fed. CI. 406, 418-21 
(Fed. CI. 1999); King Fisher Marine Serv.. Inc. v. U.S., 16 CI. Ct. 231, 237 (CI. Ct. 1989); 
Huber, Hunt & Nichols, Inc. v. Moore. 136 Cal.Rptr. 603, 618 (Cal. Ct. App.1977) (stating 
that party signing a change order had "no right to accept the Change Order, sign the accord 
and satisfaction clause, and then claim additional cost"). 
In Safeco Credit, the court was faced with a change order containing language 
strikingly similar to the language contained in Change Order 4263: 
Acceptance of this modification by the contractor constitutes an accord and 
satisfaction and represents payment in full (for both time and money) for any 
and all costs, impact effect, and/or delays arising out of, or incidental to, the 
work as herein revised and the extension of the contract completion time. 
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44 Fed. CI. at 419. While Safeco insisted that it had not intended for its signing of the 
change order to have the legal consequences set forth in the accord and satisfaction 
provision, the court held that, as a matter of law, such an allegation was insufficient to raise 
a genuine issue of material fact so as to preclude summary judgment for the government. Id. 
at 420. 
In S & G Inc. v. Intermountain Power Agency, 913 P.2d 735,738-39 (Utah 1996), the 
Utah Supreme Court detailed the requirements for an accord and satisfaction. Those elements 
are (1) a bona fide dispute over an unliquidated amount, (2) a payment made in full 
settlement of the entire dispute, and (3) an acceptance of the payment. 
The first element requires two findings: (1) that the dispute is bona fide and (2) that 
the dispute involves an unliquidated amount. The bona fide dispute element requires "a 
good-faith disagreement over the amount due under the contract." Estate Landscape v. 
Mountain States, 844 P.2d 322, 326 (Utah 1992). For a valid accord and satisfaction, a 
"disagreement need not be well founded, so long as it is in good faith." Id In this case, the 
differing interpretations of the proper amount of the back charge in Change Order 4258 
constituted a bona fide dispute. Comtrol asserted that Traco owed it $13,345.00 for crane 
usage and additional work Comtrol had to perform to complete Traco's obligations under the 
Subcontract Agreement. Traco agreed that some of its work was performed by Comtrol, but 
disputed the amounts in change Order 4258 and never signed it. (Bronson Depo, pgs. 49 -
50). Each party asserted a differing interpretation of their contract rights as applied to the 
facts, and Traco presented the Trial Court with no evidence that Comtrol maintained its 
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position in bad faith. Given this bona fide dispute, the only conclusion possible on these 
facts was that Traco had agreed, by signing Change Order No. 4263, to settlement of all its 
claims for the Army Reserve project for the total of $50,023.90, and the Trial Court was 
correct in so ruling. 
With respect to the second two elements for a valid accord and satisfaction, the checks 
paid to Traco by Comtrol for the project total $59,201.00. There was simply no evidence 
indicating that Traco did not accept these payments. Consequently, not only did Traco fail 
on its claim that it was owed any money on the U.S. Army project, but, in addition, it has 
been overpaid in the amount of $9,178.05. 
Traco argues that Change Order 4263 cannot be a valid accord and satisfaction or 
contract modification due to the timing of Comtrol's payments to Traco, noting that the last 
check which Traco received for the U.S. Army project predated Change Order 4263. This 
fact, argues Traco, precludes a finding that the change order was supported by consideration. 
This analysis misconstrues both the law concerning accord and satisfaction, and the 
consideration bargained for in Change Order 4263. 
"Generally the elements of a contract must be present in an accord and satisfaction, 
including proper subject matter, offer and acceptance, competent parties, and consideration." 
Neiderhauser Builders andDev. Corp. v. Campbell 824 P.2d 1193,1197-98 (Utah Ct.App. 
1992). On its face, Change Order 4263 sets forth an exchange of consideration between 
Traco and Comtrol. Traco received consideration because it was excused from having to 
perform a portion of its contract that Comtrol had performed instead. The Change Order set 
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forth this fact, and offered to resolve the parties' contractual responsibilities by reducing the 
contract price by $850 to $50,023.90. Given Comtrol's previous payments totaling 
$59,201.95, inherent in the Change Order was a promise on Traco's behalf to repay the 
$9,178.05 in excess of the revised contract amount. Traco's argument that the Change Order 
failed for lack of consideration was therefore misplaced as a matter of law, and the Trial 
Court properly rejected it. 
B. Mr. Bronson's Sham Affidavit was Inappropriate in the Summary 
Judgment Context. 
"The general rule is that in a summary judgment proceeding, 'when a party takes a 
clear position in a deposition, that is not modified on cross-examination, he may not 
thereafter raise an issue of fact by his own affidavit which contradicts his deposition, unless 
he can provide an explanation of the discrepancy.'" Hamicher v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 
962 P.2d 67, 71 (Utah 1998); see also, Uintah Basin Med. Ctr. v. Hardy, 110 P.3d 168, 173, 
2005 UT App 92, t 14 (Utah Ct. App. 2005) (same). 
Here, in an attempt to create a disputed material fact where none existed, Traco 
submitted a sham affidavit in which Mr. Bronson claimed, at paragraph 14 of his Affidavit, 
that he made a mistake in signing Change Order 4263. This was in clear contradiction of his 
deposition testimony. Mr. Bronson's testimony as to his understanding of the effect of 
Change order 4263 is clear: 
Q. (By Mr. Butler) I am showing you Exhibit 56. Change order 4263 
reverses $850. Is that your signature? 
A. Yes, it is. 
Q. You don't dispute this deduction, do you, in the form of a change order? 
A. No. 
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Q. And that your revised contract is $50,023.90, correct? 
A. Correct. 
Bronson Depo. at 56,1.22 - 57,1. 6. Mr. Bronson clearly understood when he signed Change 
Order 4263 that the result was a revised contract amount of $50,023.90. 
Traco did not attempt to explain the discrepancy, but instead responded to Comtrol's 
Motion to Strike by stating that not only had Mr. Bronson been mistaken in signing the 
Change Order, he had also made a mistake in testifying at his deposition. (R-604). To 
correct the second "mistake," Traco submitted an untimely deposition correction. (R-606). 
Paragraph 14 of Mr. Branson's Affidavit was improper in the summary judgment 
context and should have been stricken. Traco's failure, in its opening brief in this appeal, to 
even mention Comtrol's attempts to have the Affidavit stricken, coupled with its insistence 
that the Affidavit created an issue of material fact, are troubling, at best. 
C. Traco Failed to Prove Unilateral Mistake with Respect to Change Order 
4263. 
Rather than strike Mr. Bronson's Affidavit, the Trial Court considered its legal 
significance. Traco asserted that it was entitled to rescission of Change Order 4263 due to 
a unilateral mistake it contended Mr. Bronson had made in signing that document. 
In order to be entitled to such extraordinary relief, Traco was required to prove four 
elements: 
1. The mistake must be of so grave a consequence that to enforce the contract 
as actually made would be unconscionable. 
2. The matter as to which the mistake was made must relate to a material 
feature of the contract. 
3. Generally the mistake must have occurred notwithstanding the exercise of 
ordinary diligence by the party making the mistake. 
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4. It must be possible to give relief by way of rescission without serious 
prejudice to the other party except the loss of his bargain. In other words, it 
must be possible to put him in status quo. 
B & A Assoc, v. L.A. Young Sons Const. Co., 796 P.2d 692, 695 (Utah 1990). 
Traco failed to meet these elements. With respect to the first element, each of the 
backcharges set forth in Change Order 4263 were contractually allowable backcharges, and 
Comtrol document the basis for each of them with time cards and daily reports setting forth 
the work performed by Comtrol. (R-212 -38). As such, there was nothing unconscionable 
about enforcing Change Order 4263. 
With respect to element three, Traco failed to show that Mr. Bronson exercised 
ordinary diligence in signing the Change Order, if, as Traco alleges, he was not aware of the 
revised contract amount. The course of dealings between the parties foreclosed such a 
showing. Prior to being presented with Change Order 4263, Mr. Bronson had signed a 
number of change orders relating to this and other projects. Each of those change orders was 
on the same change order form, and contained a revised contract amount. Each contained 
the "accord and satisfaction" language contained in Change Order 4263.,Ordinary diligence, 
then, would require Mr. Bronson, prior to signing Change Order 4263, to check the contract 
balance asserted therein against his understanding of the contract balance, and to then bring 
any discrepancies to the attention of Comtrol. He did not. 
Utah jurisprudence on the meaning of "ordinary diligence" in the context of unilateral 
mistake mandated the Trial Court's conclusion that Mr. Bronson's conduct did not rise to that 
level. For example, in Maack v. Resource Design & Const., Inc., 875 P.2d 570, 574 (Utah 
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Ct. App. 1994), the Court of Appeals upheld a trial court entry of summary judgment against 
home buyers who had claimed they were entitled to a finding of unilateral mistake, and the 
resulting rescission of their home purchase contract. That contract had contained language 
stating that the home was sold "as is", without any warranty, and also contained an 
integration clause. The buyers claimed that the home was subject to a builder's warranty. 
It was undisputed that the buyers failed to ask for a copy of the builder's warranty and failed 
to condition their offer to purchase a home on the existence of the builder's warranty. Given 
these undisputed facts, the trial court's grant of summary judgment was appropriate. Id. at 
577. 
Similarly, in Klas v. Van Wagoner. 829P.2d 135,138-39 (Utah Ct. App. 1992),home 
buyers who alleged that they had made a unilateral mistake by offering $174,000 for a 
property without knowledge of a prior appraisal of the property at $ 165,000 were not entitled 
to rescission where they had failed to have the property appraised and thus not exercised 
ordinary diligence. 
Mr. Bronson's level of diligence falls well below that of the parties that were held in 
the above-referenced cases to have been insufficiently diligent to justify rescission. Unlike 
those parties, Mr. Bronson was himself in possession of the information he needed in order 
to act with ordinary diligence; it was not in the hands of a third-party homebuilder or 
property appraiser. Given the holdings in those cases, Mr. Bronson, as a matter of law, failed 
to exercise ordinary diligence sufficient to support a finding of unilateral mistake and justify 
rescission of Change Order No. 4263. See also, Oliphant v. Estate of Brunette 64 P.3d 587 
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(Utah Ct. App. 2002) (finding lack of ordinary diligence where party signed an accord and 
satisfaction, because "the document is short and easy to understand.").The trial court 
correctly rejected Traco's unilateral mistake argument and granted Comtrol summary 
judgment on the U.S. Army Reserve project. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT'S DAMAGE AWARD TO COMTROL SHOULD NOT 
BE DISTURBED. 
In awarding Comtrol damages, the Trial Court made significant reductions in the 
backcharges Comtrol sought against Traco. The Trial court found, with respect to the UVSC 
backcharges, that the rates charged by Comtrol for laborers and welders exceeded standard 
reasonable rates, and that the hours claimed for completion and repair of the Kiln gate were 
excessive and unreasonable. (R-905-05 at f 24). As such, the Trial Court reduced the UVSC 
backcharge from $17,279.73 to the "reasonable fair market amount" of $8,900. IcL With 
respect to the Weber State backcharge, the Trial Court found that the labor rates exceeded 
standard reasonable rates, some of the charges were duplicative, and some of the times cited 
to perform tasks were excessive. (R-912 at f 45). Consequently, the Trial Court reduced the 
Weber State backcharge by $8,000. Notwithstanding the Trial Court's reduction in 
Comtrol's backcharges to Traco, Traco asserts that the court erred in awarding any damages 
to Comtrol. 
dRRKl 1 
34 
A. Traco Failed to Marshall the Evidence Supporting the Trial Court's 
Damage Award. 
As is stated above, Traco has failed at one of the most fundamental requirements of 
the appellate process, marshalling. Indeed, Traco has not even attempted to fulfill this 
requirement. 
The record is replete with facts supporting the Trial Court's award of damages to 
Comtrol, including evidence regarding the reasonableness of the amounts Comtrol sought 
to backcharge Traco, including at least the following: 
The fact that Comtrol's subcontracts with Traco provided, in the last sentence of 
paragraph 26, that "Contractor shall not be obligated to Subcontractor for any amount 
greater than Contractor receives from the Owner for the change." (See, e.g., D. Ex. 
1 at 1 26). 
• The fact that Comtrol had to pay some of the costs of completing the projects with its 
own funds, and not with funds received from the owner. (R-1049 at 790,11. 9-21). 
The fact that Comtrol attempted to mitigate the expense of completing Traco's work 
by hiring a skilled welder, Gorden Johansen. (R-1049 at 957,11. 19 - 25). 
The fact that Comtrol attempted to keep the expenses and costs of completing Traco's 
work at a minimum because it believed that the odds of ever recovering anything from 
Traco were slim. (R-1049 at 958,11.1 - 10). 
The fact that the R.S. Means rate Comtrol used as a starting point for calculating its 
damages is consistent with Utah market rates for structural steel workers. (R-1049 
at 960,1.21 -961,1.4). 
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The fact that the R.S. Means rate accurately reflects the true cost to Comtrol of 
completing Traco's work. (R-1049 at 963,11. 6 - 10). 
The fact that Comtrol's costs in completing Traco's work included costs for vehicles, 
insurance, fuel, a welder, consumables for the oxyacetylene torch, grinders, and 
grinding wheels. (R-1049 at 964,11. 17 - 25). 
The fact that Comtrol's personnel who assisted with completion of Traco's work 
were, in many cases, working overtime to complete the projects on time. (R-1050 at 
1009,11.23-25). 
The fact that most of the Comtrol employees who assisted with the completion of 
Traco's work were skilled workers, not the $10 per hour laborers Traco wishes had 
performed the work. (R-1050 at 1009,11. 23-24.; R-1050 at 1012, 18 - 25). 
The fact that the rates Traco was charging on its change orders were as high as 
$59.51, exceeding Comtrol's hourly rate by almost $10.00. (P. Ex. 1, at various 
change orders; R-1050 at 1167,11. 17 - 24). This indicates that Comtrol's rate is not 
above market. 
The fact that Traco likely could have completed the work for less expense than 
Comtrol, because it has expertise in steel erection. (R-1049 at 966,11. 12 - 20). 
The fact that Comtrol made repeated efforts to get Traco to return to the job, and 
mitigate the backcharge expenses Comtrol was incurring. (R-l 049 at 968,1.24 - 969, 
1.5). 
B, Comtrol Presented Sufficient Evidence of its Damages to Sustain the Trial 
Court's Award. 
36 
I. Comtrol 's Burden of Proof on Damages. 
Before a trial court can award damages, a plaintiff must "'prove the fact of damages 
by evidence that gives 'rise to a reasonable probability that the plaintiff suffered damage . 
. . ."' Renegade Oil Inc. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co.. 101 P.3d 383, 386 (Utah Ct. App. 
2004) (quoting Atkin Wright & Miles v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co.. 709 P.2d 330, 336 
(Utah 1985)) (emphasis added). "The fact of damages must be proven by a reasonable 
certainty . . . ." Sawyers v. FMA Leasing Co.. 722 P.2d 773, 774 (Utah 1986). 
Damages are proven by a reasonable certainty when there is a '"sufficient certainty 
that reasonable minds might believe from a preponderance of the evidence that the damages 
were actually suffered.5" Kilpatrick v.Wilev Rein & Fielding. 2001 UT 107, f76, 37 P.3d 
1130, 1146 (quoting Cook Assoc. Inc. v. Warnick. 664 P.2d 1161, 1165 (Utah 1983) 
(internal quotations omitted)). This reasonable certainty requirement does not bar recovery 
if the uncertainty regards the amount of damages; rather the requirement '"is generally 
directed against uncertainty with respect to cause rather than to measure or extent [of 
damages]...." Terry v. Panek. 631 P.2d 896, 898 (Utah 1981) (quoting Gould v. Mtn. States 
Telephone & Telegraph Co.. 309 P.2d 802, 805 (Utah 1952)). Thus, while "an award based 
on total lack of evidence cannot be sustained, the fact that the evidence upon which a court 
awards damages is sparse is no reason to deny all recovery for a wrong." Id. 
When reviewing a trial court's judgment as to the fact of damages, reviewing courts 
"must" sustain the trial court's judgment "[i]f there is competent evidence to support the 
findings upon which the judgment is rendered[.]" Sawyers. 722 P.2d at 774. 
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In contrast, in Terry, the Utah Supreme Court held that a trial court erred as a matter 
of law when it concluded that the defendant's evidence was too uncertain and speculative to 
justify awarding any damages for their counterclaim, because any uncertainty as to 
defendant's evidence existed not as to "the causal connection between the wrong and the 
damage suffered," but only as to the amount of damages. 631 P.2d at 898. Because the fact 
that the defendant injured the plaintiff was not in doubt, the Court held that the plaintiff 
"'should not escape liability [solely] because the amount of [the defendant's counterclaim] 
cannot be proved with precision.'" Id. (quoting Winsness v. M. J. Conoco Distrib., 593 P.2d 
1303,1305-06 (Utah 1979)); see also. Shar's Cars v. Elder. 2004 UT App 258, f28,97 P.3d 
724, 731 (holding that a wrongdoer, "must assume some of the risk" that plaintiffs proof of 
damages will be imprecise). 
ii. The Trial Court's scrutiny ofComtrol 's Damage Evidence. 
Because Comtrol submitted significant evidence supporting the Trial Court's damage 
award, this Court should uphold the Trial Court's Ruling. Comtrol prepared detailed damage 
exhibits for each project, including time cards and daily reports that showed all hours 
expended in completing Traco's work. Two Comtrol witnesses, Sharon Zobell and Brian 
Burk, spent significant time explaining how Comtrol's damages were calculated. (R-1049 
at 788-96, Zobell testimony regarding Weber State damages; R-1049 at 801-10, Zobell 
testimony regarding UVSC damages; R-1049 at 958-66, Burk testimony re: use of R.S. 
Means and why rates set forth therein are an accurate approximation of Comtrol's costs to 
complete Traco's work). After weighing all testimony, including Traco's cross-examination 
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of Comtrol's witnesses, the Court reduced Comtrol's damages, finding that some of the time 
spent completing Traco's work was excessive, and the rates charged by Comtrol were high. 
The Trial Court reduced Comtrol's damages to what it considered a fair market rate. 
Because "a trial court is in the best position to determine what award of damages will make 
a plaintiff whole,''Kilpatrick, 37 P.3d at 1145, this Court should not reverse the Trial Court's 
careful balancing of the evidence presented at trial on Comtrol's damages. 
Hi. Comtrol's use ofR. S. Means Building Construction Cost Data, 2001, 
Western Edition was appropriate. 
Traco takes issue with Comtrol's use of a respected construction estimation guide, 
R.S. Means, in calculating its damages.4 Utah courts have endorsed the use of "industry-
accepted methods" to calculate damages, so long as the court is presented with "sufficient 
evidence to enable the trier of fact to make a reasonable approximation." Kilpatrick. 37 P.3d 
at 1146 (holding that expert testimony on value of television station which used estimates 
based on published information of Salt lake television stations was not inadequate basis for 
award of damages). 
Damage evidence based on R.S. Means has been accepted across the nation. See, e.g., 
ABT Building Products Corp v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 472 F.3d 99, 109, 
n. 13 (4th Cir. 2006) (discussing class-action settlement agreement that used R.S. Means to 
calculate costs of replacing damaged siding); Carlisle Corp v. Medical City Dallas, Ltd., 196 
4While Traco asserts in its brief that the admission of R.S. Means (D. Ex. 79) was 
improper based on rules 602, 701 and 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence (Appellant's Brief 
at 39), none of these objections were raised in the Trial Court. The only objection raised by 
Traco was one of foundation. (R-1050 at 1168,11. 16-21). 
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S.W.3d 855 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006) (finding that an expert witness who based damage 
testimony on R.S. Means was qualified to testify); Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co v. Tomlin, 
352 S.E.2d 612,616-17 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986) (finding that damages testimony based on R.S. 
Means was "more than sufficient to withstand any reasonable challenge as to damages being 
uncertain."). 
The broad acceptance of R.S. Means, coupled with the testimony of Brian Burk that 
the R.S. Means rate accurately reflects the true cost to Comtrol of completing Traco's work, 
renders Comtrol's introduction of evidence based on R.S. Means proper. (R-l 049 at 963,11. 
6-10). 
iv. The Trial Court Properly Quashed Traco 's Belated Subpoenas. 
Having failed to conduct adequate discovery on Comtrol's damages, Traco served 
subpoenas for Comtrol's wage records in the middle of trial. The subpoenas were filed in 
violation of the Trial Court's Scheduling Order and Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Rule 16(b) provides that the Court shall enter a Scheduling Order which limits 
the time to complete discovery. UTAH R. CIV. P. 16(b). In accordance with this rule, the 
deadline for completion of discovery in this case was established by Order of the Court and 
Stipulation of the Parties as February 1, 2005. (R-89). Traco blatantly disobeyed the Trial 
Court's Scheduling Order and Rule 16 by serving the subpoenas on February 8,2006, more 
than one year after the discovery deadline had expired. 
Under circumstances such as these, the Trial Court properly quashed the subpoenas. 
See. Scherer v. G.E. Capital Corp.. 185 F.R.D. 351, 351-52 (D. Kan. 1999) (quashing 
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subpoena served by plaintiff upon defendant after discovery deadline because "in the absence 
of an extension of the [discovery] deadline, a party generally may not proceed with discovery 
over objection of the opposing party."); Leach v. Quality Health Servs., Inc., 162 F.R.D. 40, 
42 (E.D. Penn. 1995) (granting motion to quash subpoena served only ten days after 
expiration of discovery deadline and awarding fees for costs incurred in bringing motion to 
quash). 
C. The Trial Court Correctly Ruled that there was no Anticipatory Breach. 
Traco argues that it was justified in abandoning both the UVSC and Weber State 
projects and refusing to complete its work because it perceived that Comtrol had 
anticipatorily breached its contracts with Traco by withholding payments for unapproved 
change orders. Traco further argues that this somehow justifies a reduction in the 
backcharges Comtrol has asserted against Traco. In light of the Trial Court's rulings that the 
Change Orders were defective, failure to pay them cannot be a basis for a finding of 
anticipatory breach by Comtrol. 
A similar argument was rejected in Stewart v. C & C Excavating & Constr. Co., 877 
F.2d 711 (8th Cir. 1989). There, a subcontractor argued that it was justified in abandoning 
a job in light of the contractor's failure to pay $2,385.78 due on a progress payment and 
refusal to pay for additional costs that the subcontractor asserted were the result of changes 
in the work. The subcontract explicitly provided that no addition or reduction of the contract 
price resulting from changes in the work would be binding on the general contractor unless 
agreed upon in writing by the parties or approved by the owner. Id. at 714. The court held 
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that the $2,385.78 was an insignificant portion of the total contract price and thus was not 
a "material breach" that would justify the subcontractor's nonperformance. Id/5 Similarly, 
in light of the clear contract limitations on submission and approval of change orders, the 
general contractor's refusal to compensate the subcontractor for additional costs did not 
justify the subcontractor's abandonment of the subcontract. See, Stewart, 877 F.2d. at 714-
15. 
The facts compel similar results here. In early January 2002, when Traco refused to 
complete the UVSC project, the agreed-to contract amount had been reduced to $ 104,099.56. 
Def. Ex. 78. Comtrol had paid Traco checks totaling $97,488.05. Thus, Traco was arguably 
owed $6,611.51, or just over 6% of its contract. This amount can be reduced even further, 
in that the subcontract provided, at paragraph 8, for 5% retention, leaving just over $1,100, 
or 1% of the original contract price, in dispute. Instead, Traco demanded $28,534.38. P. Ex. 
94. This amount clearly included unapproved change orders which had not been submitted 
in accordance with the provisions of the contract, and which Traco thus had no right to 
demand. Nor can it be said that Comtrol's failure to pay Traco for unapproved change orders 
"defeated the very object of the contract" or was "of such prime importance that the contract 
5See also, Aetna Cas. And Sur. Co. v. Aniero Concrete Co., Inc., 404 F.3d 566, 587-88 
(2d Cir. 2005) (rejecting subcontractors claim for anticipatory breach based on failiure to 
make payments); Wagstaff v. Remco, Inc., 540 P.2d 931, 933 (Utah 1975) (stating that "a 
mere delay of a month by one party in making a payment on a contract would usually result 
in damages only, but would not justify the other party in abandoning the contract"); 
Integrated Inc. v. Alec Fergusson Elec. Contractors, 58 Cal.Rptr. 503, 509 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1967) (stating that it is settled law that failure to make progress payments in building 
contracts is not the type of breach that justify's a subcontractor in abandoning the work). 
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would not have been made if default in that particular had been contemplated." Traco's 
decision to breach by abandoning the UVSC project was patently unreasonable and 
contractually unjustifiable. The Trial Court correctly found that Traco's abandonment was 
unjustified and did not support a reduction in the backcharges that were incurred in 
Comtrol's completion of Traco's work. (R-928-30). 
With respect to the Weber State job, in January of 2002, when Traco made the 
decision to abandon the job and not complete its work, Comtrol had paid Traco $252,977.85, 
and the contract amount had been reduced to $258,306.50, leaving a balance of $5,328.65, 
or even less than the 5% retention Comtrol had a right to withhold. (P. Ex. 21). Given this 
balance, and the legal principals set forth above, (including the principal that failure to pay 
unapproved change orders that did not comply with the contract's change order submission 
requirements), the Trial Court was correct in finding that Traco failed to justify its 
abandonment of the Weber State project by claiming anticipatory breach and thereby reduce 
the amount which Comtrol has properly backcharged. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT TRACO COULD 
NOT RECOVER ON ITS CHANGE ORDERS RELATED TO DWAMCO. 
A. Plaintiff Failed to Marshall the Facts Supporting the Trial Court's 
Finding that Traco was not entitled to Recover from Comtrol for Change 
Orders Related to Dwamco. 
The following facts, completely absent from Traco's analysis and duty to marshal, 
support the Trial Court's finding: 
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The fact that the subcontract requires that change orders be in writing and warns that 
a subcontractor who proceeds on verbal instructions does so at its own risk. (D. Ex. 
51 at Tf 26, and at Attachment A-l at Paragraph 11). 
The fact that the subcontract limits the Comtrol personnel with authority to approve 
Change Orders to Brian Burk and Ralph Burk. (Ex. 51 at f 26). 
The fact that Eugene Cook, Comtrol's superintendent, knew that he did not have 
authority to approve change orders and explained this to Traco every time he was 
approached with a proposed change order. (R-1050 atl062,11. 1-19, and at 1063,11. 
6-13). 
The fact that any costs for Dwamco change orders were arranged between Traco and 
Dwamco, without Comtrol's input. (R-1050 at 1063,11. 23 - 1064,1. 8). 
The fact that, when Traco sought to invoice Comtrol for this work, Comtrol 
consistently advised Traco that it should look to Dwamco for recovery. (P. Ex. 114). 
The fact that Traco did invoice Dwamco for much of this work. (P. Ex. 108). 
The fact that Traco sued Dwamco, seeking recovery for this change order work in the 
proceedings below. (R-5, Traco's Fourth Cause of Action; P. Ex. 2, captioned "Traco 
Steel Claim for Damages Against Comtrol, Inc. and/or Dwamco, Inc."). 
The fact that the one proposed Change Order, No. 5 (P. Ex. 78), bears the signature 
of Eugene Cook, who testified that when he signed, he was only verifying the hours 
worked, and not approving any change in the contract price. (R-1050 at 1067,1.19 -
1068,1. 3). 
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The fact that no evidence was presented of any meeting of the minds between 
Comtrol and Traco on price or a method for determining price, rendering the proposed 
change orders too indefinite and uncertain for enforcement. (R-907 at f 29). 
B. The Trial Court Correctly Ruled that there was no Agreement Between 
Comtrol and Traco with Respect to the Dwamco Change Orders. 
The Trial Court properly rejected Traco's misguided attempts to collect payment from 
Comtrol on work Traco performed at the request of Dwamco. The uncontroverted evidence 
at trial was that Mr. Cook had no authority to approve Change Orders, that this was set forth 
in the contract, that Traco was informed of this in writing, and orally by Mr. Cook, and that 
any discussions about the cost of Traco's work were between Traco and Dwamco, with no 
input from Comtrol. 
Traco presented no evidence at trial to contradict Mr. Cook's or Comtrol's assertions 
that Comtrol was not a party to Traco's arrangements with Dwamco, and thus no proof that 
the amounts sought by Traco in its unapproved change orders were in any way approved by 
Comtrol. Where Comtrol was not a party to separate arrangements between Traco and 
Dwamco, the Trial Court was correct in not holding it responsible for payment of the 
obligations created by those arrangements. 
Traco argues that the Trial Court's granting summary judgment to Dwamco on 
Dwamco's assertions that there was no contract between Traco and Dwamco mandates a 
finding that there was a contract between Comtrol and Traco for this work. However, no 
such conclusion is required. Instead, the logical extension of the Trial Court's rulings is that 
Traco failed to contract with either Dwamco or Comtrol. Traco's failure to protect itself is 
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not, however, a reason to hold Comtrol responsible.6 The Trial Court correctly recognized 
that Comtrol had not received additional payment from the owner for this work, barring 
Traco's claim pursuant to the last sentence of Paragraph 26 of the subcontract. (D. Ex. 51). 
That finding should not be disturbed. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT APPROPRIATELY ENFORCED LIEN WAIVERS 
EXECUTED BY TRACO THAT BARRED MANY OF ITS CHANGE ORDER 
CLAIMS. 
Two releases are relevant here: (1) a UVSC release cutting off claims for all labor and 
materials provided on or before April 30, 2001. D. Ex. 63; and (2) a Weber State release 
cutting off claims for all labor and materials provided on or before August 31,2001. (D. Ex. 
12). 
A. Traco has Failed to Marshall Evidence Supporting the Trial Court's Lien 
Release Ruling. 
In discussing the Trial Court's ruling on lien releases, Traco has failed to address its 
efforts to create an ambiguity in the language of the releases. The releases state that Traco 
was releasing "all rights to . . . claims . . . for labor and materials furnished on or before 
[date]." Traco argued at trial that this language only has reference to contract work, and 
change order work is therefore not waived; indeed, according to Traco, the lien releases only 
waive claims for the dollar amounts set forth therein. In support of this interpretation, 
Traco's witnesses testified that Comtrol personnel had represented that the lien releases only 
6Had Traco been concerned about protecting itself, even without agreements with Comtrol 
and/or Dwamco for this work, it could have made a payment bond claim, asserting that it had 
provided labor and/or materials to the project, and had not been paid. It failed to do so. 
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had reference to contract payments, not change orders. (See, e.g., R-1046 at 221,11. 3-18; 
R-1046 at 231, 11. 5 - 19; R-1048 at 595, 1. 16 - 596, 1. 596). In fact, Traco's secretary 
testified that she considered the effective date set forth in the release meaningless. (R-1048 
at 599,11. 7-11). 
When asked to name the Comtrol representatives who had been involved in these 
conversations, Traco identified Brian Burk (R-1046 at 231,11. 13 - 19), Sharon Zobell (R-
1046 at 231,1. 23; R-1046 at 232,11. 8 - 12), and Brian Burk's wife, Shauna Burk (R-1046 
at 231,11. 24 - 25). However, each of these witnesses, in turn, denied ever having such a 
conversation with a Traco representative. (See, R-l 049 at 796 - 801, Sharon Zobell denying 
ever discussing effect of lien releases with Traco representatives; R-1049 at 858,1.21 - 859, 
1. 11, Shauna Burk denying ever communicating with Traco regarding legal effect of a lien 
release; R-1049 at 939, 1. 8 - 940, 1. 5, Brian Burk denying such a conversation). Traco 
completely eliminated from its brief any mention of this fact dispute (which required careful 
weighing of credibility by the Trial Court). The Trial Court weighed the testimony and found 
in favor of Comtrol. This Court should affirm the Trial Court's findings where there is 
evidence supporting such findings. 
B. The Trial Court Correctly Interpreted Unambiguous Lien Releases, 
Even more importantly for Traco's assertion that the lien releases did not release 
change order claims, no such interpretation appears on the face of the unambiguous 
documents. Traco's argument was therefore based solely on parol evidence, and was 
therefore properly rejected based on a long line of Utah precedent which prohibit such 
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evidence in interpreting unambiguous lien releases. See, e.g.. Projects Unlimited, Inc. v. 
Copper State Thrift & Loan Co., 798 P.2d 738, 753 (Utah 1990) (stating that trial court had 
properly refused to consider parol evidence on meaning of lien release where language was 
susceptible of only one interpretation); Niederhauser Builders and Dev. Corp., 824 P.2d 
1193, 1196 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (upholding summary judgment ruling that builder had 
waived its right to file a lien on property for all work and materials predating unambiguous 
lien waiver). 
This Court should affirm the Trial Court's findings. 
VI. THE ATTORNEYS' FEES AWARD SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED. 
Traco's attorneys' fees argument appears to be an afterthought, meant solely to 
illustrate that if Traco had won at trial, Traco would have been entitled to its attorneys fees. 
Traco did not win at trial, however. Because the Trial Court's rulings that gave rise to an 
award of attorneys' fees to Comtrol are legally sound and should not be overturned, the 
attorneys' fees award itself should also stand. 
CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, Comtrol respectfully requests that this Court deny Traco's appeal in 
its entirety. 
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